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Statistical Inference: The Big Picture1
Robert E. Kass
Abstract. Statistics has moved beyond the frequentist-Bayesian con-
troversies of the past. Where does this leave our ability to interpret re-
sults? I suggest that a philosophy compatible with statistical practice,
labeled here statistical pragmatism, serves as a foundation for infer-
ence. Statistical pragmatism is inclusive and emphasizes the assump-
tions that connect statistical models with observed data. I argue that
introductory courses often mischaracterize the process of statistical in-
ference and I propose an alternative “big picture” depiction.
Key words and phrases: Bayesian, confidence, frequentist, statistical
education, statistical pragmatism, statistical significance.
1. INTRODUCTION
The protracted battle for the foundations of statis-
tics, joined vociferously by Fisher, Jeffreys, Neyman,
Savage and many disciples, has been deeply illumi-
nating, but it has left statistics without a philoso-
phy that matches contemporary attitudes. Because
each camp took as its goal exclusive ownership of
inference, each was doomed to failure. We have all,
or nearly all, moved past these old debates, yet our
textbook explanations have not caught up with the
eclecticism of statistical practice.
The difficulties go both ways. Bayesians have de-
nied the utility of confidence and statistical signifi-
cance, attempting to sweep aside the obvious success
of these concepts in applied work. Meanwhile, for
their part, frequentists have ignored the possibility
of inference about unique events despite their ubiq-
uitous occurrence throughout science. Furthermore,
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interpretations of posterior probability in terms of
subjective belief, or confidence in terms of long-run
frequency, give students a limited and sometimes
confusing view of the nature of statistical inference.
When used to introduce the expression of uncer-
tainty based on a random sample, these caricatures
forfeit an opportunity to articulate a fundamental
attitude of statistical practice.
Most modern practitioners have, I think, an open-
minded view about alternative modes of inference,
but are acutely aware of theoretical assumptions and
the many ways they may be mistaken. I would sug-
gest that it makes more sense to place in the center
of our logical framework the match or mismatch of
theoretical assumptions with the real world of data.
This, it seems to me, is the common ground that
Bayesian and frequentist statistics share; it is more
fundamental than either paradigm taken separately;
and as we strive to foster widespread understanding
of statistical reasoning, it is more important for be-
ginning students to appreciate the role of theoret-
ical assumptions than for them to recite correctly
the long-run interpretation of confidence intervals.
With the hope of prodding our discipline to right
a lingering imbalance, I attempt here to describe the
dominant contemporary philosophy of statistics.
2. STATISTICAL PRAGMATISM
I propose to call this modern philosophy statisti-
cal pragmatism. I think it is based on the following
attitudes:
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1. Confidence, statistical significance, and posterior
probability are all valuable inferential tools.
2. Simple chance situations, where counting argu-
ments may be based on symmetries that generate
equally likely outcomes (six faces on a fair die; 52
cards in a shuffled deck), supply basic intuitions
about probability. Probability may be built up
to important but less immediately intuitive situ-
ations using abstract mathematics, much the way
real numbers are defined abstractly based on in-
tuitions coming from fractions. Probability is use-
fully calibrated in terms of fair bets: another way
to say the probability of rolling a 3 with a fair
die is 1/6 is that 5 to 1 odds against rolling a 3
would be a fair bet.
3. Long-run frequencies are important mathemati-
cally, interpretively, and pedagogically. However,
it is possible to assign probabilities to unique
events, including rolling a 3 with a fair die or
having a confidence interval cover the true mean,
without considering long-run frequency. Long-run
frequencies may be regarded as consequences of
the law of large numbers rather than as part of
the definition of probability or confidence.
4. Similarly, the subjective interpretation of poste-
rior probability is important as a way of under-
standing Bayesian inference, but it is not funda-
mental to its use: in reporting a 95% posterior
interval one need not make a statement such as,
“My personal probability of this interval covering
the mean is 0.95.”
5. Statistical inferences of all kinds use statistical
models, which embody theoretical assumptions.
As illustrated in Figure 1, like scientific models,
statistical models exist in an abstract framework;
to distinguish this framework from the real world
inhabited by data we may call it a “theoretical
world.” Random variables, confidence intervals,
and posterior probabilities all live in this theo-
retical world. When we use a statistical model to
make a statistical inference we implicitly assert
that the variation exhibited by data is captured
reasonably well by the statistical model, so that
the theoretical world corresponds reasonably well
to the real world. Conclusions are drawn by ap-
plying a statistical inference technique, which is
a theoretical construct, to some real data. Fig-
ure 1 depicts the conclusions as straddling the
theoretical and real worlds. Statistical inferences
may have implications for the real world of new
observable phenomena, but in scientific contexts,
Fig. 1. The big picture of statistical inference.
Statistical procedures are abstractly defined in
terms of mathematics but are used, in conjunc-
tion with scientific models and methods, to explain
observable phenomena. This picture emphasizes the hypothet-
ical link between variation in data and its description using
statistical models.
conclusions most often concern scientific models
(or theories), so that their “real world” implica-
tions (involving new data) are somewhat indirect
(the new data will involve new and different ex-
periments).
The statistical models in Figure 1 could involve
large function spaces or other relatively weak prob-
abilistic assumptions. Careful consideration of the
connection between models and data is a core com-
ponent of both the art of statistical practice and
the science of statistical methodology. The purpose
of Figure 1 is to shift the grounds for discussion.
Note, in particular, that data should not be con-
fused with random variables. Random variables live
in the theoretical world. When we say things like,
“Let us assume the data are normally distributed”
and we proceed to make a statistical inference, we
do not need to take these words literally as asserting
that the data form a random sample. Instead, this
kind of language is a convenient and familiar short-
hand for the much weaker assertion that, for our
specified purposes, the variability of the data is ade-
quately consistent with variability that would occur
in a random sample. This linguistic amenity is used
routinely in both frequentist and Bayesian frame-
works. Historically, the distinction between data and
random variables, the match of the model to the
data, was set aside, to be treated as a separate topic
apart from the foundations of inference. But once
the data themselves were considered random vari-
ables, the frequentist-Bayesian debate moved into
the theoretical world: it became a debate about the
best way to reason from random variables to infer-
ences about parameters. This was consistent with
developments elsewhere. In other parts of science,
the distinction between quantities to be measured
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Fig. 2. (A) BARS fits to a pair of peri-stimulus time histograms displaying neural firing rate of a particular neuron under
two alternative experimental conditions. (B) The two BARS fits are overlaid for ease of comparison.
and their theoretical counterparts within a mathe-
matical theory can be relegated to a different sub-
ject—to a theory of errors. In statistics, we do not
have that luxury, and it seems to me important,
from a pragmatic viewpoint, to bring to center stage
the identification of models with data. The purpose
of doing so is that it provides different interpreta-
tions of both frequentist and Bayesian inference, in-
terpretations which, I believe, are closer to the atti-
tude of modern statistical practitioners.
A familiar practical situation where these issues
arise is binary regression. A classic example comes
from a psychophysical experiment conducted by
Hecht, Schlaer and Pirenne (1942), who investigated
the sensitivity of the human visual system by con-
structing an apparatus that would emit flashes of
light at very low intensity in a darkened room. Those
authors presented light of varying intensities repeat-
edly to several subjects and determined, for each in-
tensity, the proportion of times each subject would
respond that he or she had seen a flash of light.
For each subject the resulting data are repeated bi-
nary observations (“yes” perceived versus “no” did
not perceive) at each of many intensities and, these
days, the standard statistical tool to analyze such
data is logistic regression. We might, for instance,
use maximum likelihood to find a 95% confidence in-
terval for the intensity of light at which the subject
would report perception with probability p = 0.5.
Because the data reported by Hecht et al. involved
fairly large samples, we would obtain essentially the
same answer if instead we applied Bayesian methods
to get an interval having 95% posterior probability.
But how should such an interval be interpreted?
A more recent example comes from DiMatteo, Gen-
ovese and Kass (2001), who illustrated a new non-
parametric regression method called Bayesian adap-
tive regression splines (BARS) by analyzing neu-
ral firing rate data from inferotemporal cortex of
a macaque monkey. The data came from a study ul-
timately reported by Rollenhagen and Olson (2005),
which investigated the differential response of indi-
vidual neurons under two experimental conditions.
Figure 2 displays BARS fits under the two condi-
tions. One way to quantify the discrepancy between
the fits is to estimate the drop in firing rate from
peak (the maximal firing rate) to the trough im-
mediately following the peak in each condition. Let
us call these peak minus trough differences, under
the two conditions, φ1 and φ2. Using BARS, DiMat-
teo, Genovese and Kass reported a posterior mean
of φˆ1 − φˆ2 = 50.0 with posterior standard deviation
(±20.8). In follow-up work, Wallstrom, Liebner and
Kass (2008) reported very good frequentist cover-
age probability of 95% posterior probability inter-
vals based on BARS for similar quantities under
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simulation conditions chosen to mimic such experi-
mental data. Thus, a BARS-based posterior interval
could be considered from either a Bayesian or fre-
quentist point of view. Again we may ask how such
an inferential interval should be interpreted.
3. INTERPRETATIONS
Statistical pragmatism involves mildly altered in-
terpretations of frequentist and Bayesian inference.
For definiteness I will discuss the paradigm case of
confidence and posterior intervals for a normal mean
based on a sample of size n, with the standard de-
viation being known. Suppose that we have n= 49
observations that have a sample mean equal to 10.2.
Frequentist assumptions. Suppose X1,X2,
. . . ,Xn are i.i.d. random variables from a normal
distribution with mean µ and standard deviation
σ = 1. In other words, suppose X1,X2, . . . ,Xn form
a random sample from a N(µ,1) distribution.
Noting that x¯ = 10.2 and
√
49 = 7 we define the
inferential interval
I = (10.2− 27 ,10.2 + 27).
The interval I may be regarded as a 95% confidence
interval. I now contrast the standard frequentist in-
terpretation with the pragmatic interepretation.
Frequentist interpretation of confidence
interval. Under the assumptions above, if we we-
re to draw infinitely many random samples from a
N(µ,1) distribution, 95% of the corresponding con-
fidence intervals (X¯ − 27 , X¯ + 27) would cover µ.
Pragmatic interpretation of confidence
interval. If we were to draw a random sample
according to the assumptions above, the resulting
confidence interval (X¯− 27 , X¯+ 27) would have prob-
ability 0.95 of covering µ. Because the random sam-
ple lives in the theoretical world, this is a theoretical
statement. Nonetheless, substituting
X¯ = x¯(1)
together with
x¯= 10.2(2)
we obtain the interval I , and are able to draw use-
ful conclusions as long as our theoretical world is
aligned well with the real world that produced the
data.
The main point here is that we do not need a long-
run interpretation of probability, but we do have
to be reminded that the unique-event probability
of 0.95 remains a theoretical statement because it
applies to random variables rather than data. Let
us turn to the Bayesian case.
Bayesian assumptions. Suppose X1,X2,
. . . ,Xn form a random sample from a N(µ,1) distri-
bution and the prior distribution of µ is N(µ0, τ
2),
with τ2≫ 149 and 49τ2 ≫ |µ0|.
The posterior distribution of µ is normal, the pos-
terior mean becomes
µ¯=
τ2
1/49 + τ2
10.2 +
1/49
1/49 + τ2
µ0
and the posterior variance is
v =
(
49 +
1
τ2
)
−1
but because τ2≫ 149 and 49τ2 ≫ |µ0| we have
µ¯≈ 10.2
and
v ≈ 1
49
.
Therefore, the inferential interval I defined above
has posterior probability 0.95.
Bayesian interpretation of posterior in-
terval. Under the assumptions above, the prob-
ability that µ is in the interval I is 0.95.
Pragmatic interpretation of posterior in-
terval. If the data were a random sample for
which (2) holds, that is, x¯ = 10.2, and if the as-
sumptions above were to hold, then the probability
that µ is in the interval I would be 0.95. This refers
to a hypothetical value x¯ of the random variable
X¯ , and because X¯ lives in the theoretical world the
statement remains theoretical. Nonetheless, we are
able to draw useful conclusions from the data as long
as our theoretical world is aligned well with the real
world that produced the data.
Here, although the Bayesian approach escapes the
indirectness of confidence within the theoretical
world, it cannot escape it in the world of data anal-
ysis because there remains the additional layer of
identifying data with random variables. According
to the pragmatic interpretation, the posterior is not,
literally, a statement about the way the observed
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data relate to the unknown parameter µ because
those objects live in different worlds. The language
of Bayesian inference, like the language of frequen-
tist inference, takes a convenient shortcut by blur-
ring the distinction between data and random vari-
ables.
The commonality between frequentist and Baye-
sian inferences is the use of theoretical assumptions,
together with a subjunctive statement. In both ap-
proaches a statistical model is introduced—in the
Bayesian case the prior distributions become part of
what I am here calling the model—and we may say
that the inference is based on what would happen
if the data were to be random variables distributed
according to the statistical model. This modeling as-
sumption would be reasonable if the model were to
describe accurately the variation in the data.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING
It is important for students in introductory statis-
tics courses to see the subject as a coherent, princi-
pled whole. Instructors, and textbook authors, may
try to help by providing some notion of a “big pic-
ture.” Often this is done literally, with an illustra-
tion such as Figure 3 (e.g., Lovett, Meyer and Thille,
2008). This kind of illustration can be extremely use-
ful if referenced repeatedly throughout a course.
Figure 3 represents a standard story about statis-
tical inference. Fisher introduced the idea of a ran-
dom sample drawn from a hypothetical infinite pop-
ulation, and Neyman and Pearson’s work encour-
aged subsequent mathematical statisticians to drop
the word “hypothetical” and instead describe statis-
tical inference as analogous to simple random sam-
pling from a finite population. This is the concept
that Figure 3 tries to get across. My complaint is
that it is not a good general description of statistical
Fig. 3. The big picture of statistical inference according to
the standard conception. Here, a random sample is pictured
as a sample from a finite population.
inference, and my claim is that Figure 1 is more ac-
curate. For instance, in the psychophysical example
of Hecht, Schlaer and Pirenne discussed in Section
2, there is no population of “yes” or “no” replies
from which a random sample is drawn. We do not
need to struggle to make an analogy with a simple
random sample. Furthermore, any thoughts along
these lines may draw attention away from the most
important theoretical assumptions, such as indepen-
dence among the responses. Figure 1 is supposed to
remind students to look for the important assump-
tions, and ask whether they describe the variation
in the data reasonably accurately.
One of the reasons the population and sample pic-
ture in Figure 3 is so attractive pedagogically is that
it reinforces the fundamental distinction between
parameters and statistics through the terms popula-
tion mean and sample mean. To my way of thinking,
this terminology, inherited from Fisher, is unfortu-
nate. Instead of “population mean” I would much
prefer theoretical mean, because it captures better
the notion that a theoretical distribution is being
introduced, a notion that is reinforced by Figure 1.
I have found Figure 1 helpful in teaching basic
statistics. For instance, when talking about random
variables I like to begin with a set of data, where
variation is displayed in a histogram, and then say
that probability may be used to describe such vari-
ation. I then tell the students we must introduce
mathematical objects called random variables, and
in defining them and applying the concept to the
data at hand, I immediately acknowledge that this
is an abstraction, while also stating that—as the stu-
dents will see repeatedly in many examples—it can
be an extraordinarily useful abstraction whenever
the theoretical world of random variables is aligned
well with the real world of the data.
I have also used Figure 1 in my classes when de-
scribing attitudes toward data analysis that statisti-
cal training aims to instill. Specifically, I define sta-
tistical thinking, as in the article by Brown and Kass
(2009), to involve two principles:
1. Statistical models of regularity and variability in
data may be used to express knowledge and un-
certainty about a signal in the presence of noise,
via inductive reasoning.
2. Statistical methods may be analyzed to deter-
mine how well they are likely to perform.
Principle 1 identifies the source of statistical infer-
ence to be the hypothesized link between data and
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Fig. 4. A more elaborate big picture, reflecting in greater detail the process of statistical inference. As in Figure 1, there is
a hypothetical link between data and statistical models but here the data are connected more specifically to their representation
as random variables.
statistical models. In explaining, I explicitly distin-
guish the use of probability to describe variation
and to express knowledge. A probabilistic descrip-
tion of variation would be “The probability of rolling
a 3 with a fair die is 1/6” while an expression of
knowledge would be “I’m 90% sure the capital of
Wyoming is Cheyenne.” These two sorts of state-
ments, which use probability in different ways, are
sometimes considered to involve two different kinds
of probability, which have been called “aleatory prob-
ability” and “epistemic probability.” Bayesians mer-
ge these, applying the laws of probability to go from
quantitative description to quantified belief, but in
every form of statistical inference aleatory probabil-
ity is used, somehow, to make epistemic statements.
This is Principle 1. Principle 2 is that the same sorts
of statistical models may be used to evaluate sta-
tistical procedures—though in the classroom I also
explain that performance of procedures is usually
investigated under varying circumstances.
For somewhat more advanced audiences it is pos-
sible to elaborate, describing in more detail the pro-
cess trained statisticians follow when reasoning from
data. A big picture of the overall process is given
in Figure 4. That figure indicates the hypothetical
connection between data and random variables, be-
tween key features of unobserved mechanisms and
parameters, and between real-world and theoretical
conclusions. It further indicates that data display
both regularity (which is often described in theo-
retical terms as a “signal,” sometimes conforming
to simple mathematical descriptions or “laws”) and
unexplained variability, which is usually taken to be
“noise.” The figure also includes the components
exploratory data analysis—EDA—and algorithms,
but the main message of Figure 4, given by the la-
bels of the two big boxes, is the same as that in
Figure 1.
5. DISCUSSION
According to my understanding, laid out above,
statistical pragmatism has two main features: it is
eclectic and it emphasizes the assumptions that con-
nect statistical models with observed data. The prag-
matic view acknowledges that both sides of the fre-
quentist-Bayesian debate made important points.
Bayesians scoffed at the artificiality in using sam-
pling from a finite population to motivate all of
inference, and in using long-run behavior to define
characteristics of procedures. Within the theoretical
world, posterior probabilities are more direct, and
therefore seemed to offer much stronger inferences.
Frequentists bristled, pointing to the subjectivity of
prior distributions. Bayesians responded by treating
subjectivity as a virtue on the grounds that all in-
ferences are subjective yet, while there is a kernel
of truth in this observation—we are all human be-
ings, making our own judgments—subjectivism was
never satisfying as a logical framework: an impor-
tant purpose of the scientific enterprise is to go be-
yond personal decision-making. Nonetheless, from
a pragmatic perspective, while the selection of prior
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probabilities is important, their use is not so prob-
lematic as to disqualify Bayesian methods, and in
looking back on history the introduction of prior
distributions may not have been the central bother-
some issue it was made out to be. Instead, it seems
to me, the really troubling point for frequentists
has been the Bayesian claim to a philosophical high
ground, where compelling inferences could be de-
livered at negligible logical cost. Frequentists have
always felt that no such thing should be possible.
The difficulty begins not with the introduction of
prior distributions but with the gap between models
and data, which is neither frequentist nor Bayesian.
Statistical pragmatism avoids this irritation by ac-
knowledging explicitly the tenuous connection be-
tween the real and theoretical worlds. As a result,
its inferences are necessarily subjunctive. We speak
of what would be inferred if our assumptions were
to hold. The inferential bridge is traversed, by both
frequentist and Bayesian methods, when we act as if
the data were generated by random variables. In the
normal mean example discussed in Section 4, the key
step involves the conjunction of the two equations
(1) and (2). Strictly speaking, according to statisti-
cal pragmatism, equation (1) lives in the theoretical
world while equation (2) lives in the real world; the
bridge is built by allowing x¯ to refer to both the
theoretical value of the random variable and the ob-
served data value.
In pondering the nature of statistical inference I
am, like others, guided partly by past and present
sages (for an overview see Barnett, 1999), but also
by my own experience and by watching many col-
leagues in action. Many of the sharpest and most
vicious Bayes-frequentist debates took place during
the dominance of pure theory in academia. Statis-
ticians are now more inclined to argue about the
extent to which a method succeeds in solving a data
analytic problem. Much statistical practice revolves
around getting good estimates and standard errors
in complicated settings where statistical uncertainty
is smaller than the unquantified aggregate of many
other uncertainties in scientific investigation. In such
contexts, the distinction between frequentist and
Bayesian logic becomes unimportant and con tem-
porary practitioners move freely between frequentist
and Bayesian techniques using one or the other de-
pending on the problem. Thus, in a review of statis-
tical methods in neurophysiology in which my col-
leagues and I discussed both frequentist and Baye-
sian methods (Kass, Ventura and Brown, 2005), not
only did we not emphasize this dichotomy but we
did not even mention the distinction between the
approaches or their inferential interpretations.
In fact, in my first publication involving analysis
of neural data (Olson et al., 2001) we reported more
than a dozen different statistical analyses, some fre-
quentist, some Bayesian. Furthermore, methods from
the two approaches are sometimes glued together in
a single analysis. For example, to examine several
neural firing-rate intensity functions λ1(t), . . . , λp(t),
assumed to be smooth functions of time t, Behseta et
al. (2007) developed a frequentist approach to test-
ing the hypothesis H0 :λ
1(t) = · · ·= λp(t), for all t,
that incorporated BARS smoothing. Such hybrids
are not uncommon, and they do not force a prac-
titioner to walk around with mutually inconsistent
interpretations of statistical inference. Figure 1 pro-
vides a general framework that encompasses both
of the major approaches to methodology while em-
phasizing the inherent gap between data and mod-
eling assumptions, a gap that is bridged through
subjunctive statements. The advantage of the prag-
matic framework is that it considers frequentist and
Bayesian inference to be equally respectable and al-
lows us to have a consistent interpretation, without
feeling as if we must have split personalities in or-
der to be competent statisticians. More to the point,
this framework seems to me to resemble more closely
what we do in practice: statisticians offer inferences
couched in a cautionary attitude. Perhaps we might
even say that most practitioners are subjunctivists.
I have emphasized subjunctive statements partly
because, on the frequentist side, they eliminate any
need for long-run interpretation. For Bayesian meth-
ods they eliminate reliance on subjectivism. The
Bayesian point of view was articulated admirably
by Jeffreys (see Robert, Chopin and Rousseau, 2009,
and accompanying discussion) but it became clear,
especially from the arguments of Savage and sub-
sequent investigations in the 1970s, that the only
solid foundation for Bayesianism is subjective (see
Kass and Wasserman, 1996, and Kass, 2006). Sta-
tistical pragmatism pulls us out of that solipsistic
quagmire. On the other hand, I do not mean to im-
ply that it really does not matter what approach
is taken in a particular instance. Current attention
frequently focuses on challenging, high-dimensional
datasets where frequentist and Bayesian methods
may differ. Statistical pragmatism is agnostic on
this. Instead, procedures should be judged according
to their performance under theoretical conditions
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thought to capture relevant real-world variation in
a particular applied setting. This is where our juxta-
position of the theoretical world with the real world
earns its keep.
I called the story about statistical inference told
by Figure 3 “standard” because it is imbedded in
many introductory texts, such as the path-breaking
book by Freedman, Pisani and Purves (2007) and
the excellent and very popular book by Moore and
McCabe (2005). My criticism is that the standard
story misrepresents the way statistical inference is
commonly understood by trained statisticians, por-
traying it as analogous to simple random sampling
from a finite population. As I noted, the population
versus sampling terminology comes from Fisher, but
I believe the conception in Figure 1 is closer to Fi-
sher’s conception of the relationship between theory
and data. Fisher spoke pointedly of a hypothetical
infinite population, but in the standard story of Fig-
ure 3 the “hypothetical” part of this notion—which
is crucial to the concept—gets dropped (confer also
Lenhard, 2006). I understand Fisher’s “hypotheti-
cal” to connote what I have here called “theoreti-
cal.” Fisher did not anticipate the co-option of his
framework and was, in large part for this reason,
horrified by subsequent developments by Neyman
and Pearson. The terminology “theoretical” avoids
this confusion and thus may offer a clearer represen-
tation of Fisher’s idea.1
We now recognize Neyman and Pearson to have
made permanent, important contributions to sta-
tistical inference through their introduction of hy-
pothesis testing and confidence. From today’s van-
tage point, however, their behavioral interpretation
seems quaint, especially when represented by their
famous dictum, “We are inclined to think that as
far as a particular hypothesis is concerned, no test
based upon the theory of probability can by itself
provide any valuable evidence of the truth or false-
hood of that hypothesis.” Nonetheless, that inter-
pretation seems to have inspired the attitude be-
hind Figure 3. In the extreme, one may be led to
insist that statistical inferences are valid only when
some chance mechanism has generated the data. The
problem with the chance-mechanism conception is
that it applies to a rather small part of the real
world, where there is either actual random sampling
1Fisher also introduced populations partly because he used
long-run frequency as a foundation for probability, which sta-
tistical pragmatism considers unnecessary.
or situations described by statistical or quantum
physics. I believe the chance-mechanism conception
errs in declaring that data are assumed to be random
variables, rather than allowing the gap of Figure 1
to be bridged2 by statements such as (2). In say-
ing this I am trying to listen carefully to the voice
in my head that comes from the late David Freed-
man (see Freedman and Ziesel, 1988). I imagine he
might call crossing this bridge, in the absence of an
explicit chance mechanism, a leap of faith. In a strict
sense I am inclined to agree. It seems to me, how-
ever, that it is precisely this leap of faith that makes
statistical reasoning possible in the vast majority of
applications.
Statistical models that go beyond chance mecha-
nisms have been central to statistical inference since
Fisher and Jeffreys, and their role in reasoning has
been considered by many authors (e.g., Cox, 1990;
Lehmann, 1990). An outstanding issue is the ex-
tent to which statistical models are like the theo-
retical models used throughout science (see Stan-
ford, 2006). I would argue, on the one hand, that
they are similar: the most fundamental belief of any
scientist is that the theoretical and real worlds are
aligned. On the other hand, as observed in Section
2, statistics is unique in having to face the gap be-
tween theoretical and real worlds every time a model
is applied and, it seems to me, this is a big part of
what we offer our scientific collaborators. Statisti-
cal pragmatism recognizes that all forms of statisti-
cal inference make assumptions, assumptions which
can only be tested very crudely (with such things as
goodness-of-fit methods) and can almost never be
verified. This is not only at the heart of statistical
inference, it is also the great wisdom of our field.
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